in this country at any rate,,of the enteric epidemic in Flanders, and so much, comparatively, of epidemics of other diseases in various theatres of the War. Not that I can claim to furnish the finished picture. I did not see enough of the epidemic; I caught but glimpses here and there. It engaged the attention of several different authorities, those of the Belgian, French and British Armies and of the Belgian Civil Government (not to mention those of the German Army), so that only a writer who has access to the several official documents and has studied its phases continuously and on the spot, can hope to present a complete and accurate account of the epidemic as a whole. I saw and learnt enough, however, of its main features to justify me in bringing some account of it, however imperfect, to the notice of this Section.
It is certain that enteric fever was prevalent, though perhaps not widely prevalent, in Belgium at or about the time the War broke out, and soon after that date indications of an epidemic began to appear. Cases of enteric began to crop up in England during the autumn of 1914 among Belgian refugees who must have become infected in the country from which they had fled. I had a few cases of this kind under my own observation at the Eastern Hospital, Homerton. For instance, a certain family left their home in Werchter, a few miles from Louvain, on September 12 and went to Baal the same day. There they stayed till September 26, when they left for Antwerp, which they reached on the 27th. On October 4 they sailed from Antwerp for London and they arrived at the Alexandra Palace (then used as a refuge) on October 6. Two of the family, a boy and a girl, began to fall ill on the steamer between Antwerp and London. Allowing for an incubation period of ten 'days these children must have been infected about September 25, while they were at Baal. Similar cases continued to be met with in London up to January, 1915 [1] .
You will remember that the German Army, after the first few days of the War, advanced rapidly through Belgium and many of the inhabitants fled hastily before it. Some of the advanced patrols of the German Army were reported at the time to have pushed forward so far ahead as to have got out of touch with the main body and to have been temporarily short of provisions, so that a silly rumour arose that the German Army was already getting into a bad way as regards its food supplies. The flight of the inhabitants and the rapid advance of the Germans were eminently calculated to spread enteiic fever amongst the latter as well as the former, if the disease was already at all prevalent. Besides these factors the nature of the invaded country has Section of Epidemiology and State Medicine to be considered. The whole country west of a line drawn through Antwerp and Brussels is a plain, intersected with rivers, mostly canalized, canals and ditches, the water in which can flow but very slowly. This plain is in places thickly populated and highly cultivated, and human excreta are largely used for the purpose of fertilization. The water' supply-is derived, at any rate in the villages and small towns, from wells, mostly shallow. It will be remembered, further, that the Belgians as a defensive measure flooded the country to the north-east of Dixmude, and the scheme of inundation was completed by November 18. The, effect of this was to accentuate the natural stagnation and to swamp large areas in that part of the country. About the third week in November the German Army was held up at a line, which, starting from near Nieuport on the coast, ran southwards east of Ypres and west of Lille; trench warfare began, and the trenches, largely in consequence of the inundations above mentioned, became flooded. Further, those who, like myself, are convinced that antityphoid inoculation is a valuable prophylactic against typhoid fever would adduce as another favourable condition the fact that of the four armies engaged in Flanders, only the British was at all adequately protected' by that measure. From what was said at a meetin7g of the Strasburg Society of Military Surgeons [2] towards the end of 1914, it appears that antityphoid inoculation was not practised with any thoroughness in the German Army during the first months of the War. This statement is corroborated by Goldscheider and Kroner [3] who, in September, 1915, recorded the fact that antityphoid inoculation was not begun in that army till late in October, 1914; and again later, by Henke [4] , who in an analysis of autopsies of German soldiers who died of enteric in Flanders at that time states that few of them had undergone inoculation. As regards the French Axmy Vincent and Muratet [5] write that " the circumstances of the present war did not at first permit of the universal employment of preventive vaccination in the Army"; and Blum and Voisin [6] , in drawing attention to the modification which enteric fever in the French Army underwent soon after the beginning of 1915, concluded that the change was due to the fact that by that time the troops were inoculated, whereas before that date they had not been so protected. With all these favouring conditions it was not surprising to find Major Stedman, R.A.M.C. (T.), writing to the Times on December 1 to say that there was a good deal of typhoid amongst the Belgian troops and that an epidemic was to be feared in Flanders. He suggested that a hospital F-3a for 600 beds should be established 4t La Panne and another for 300 at Calais. According to a statement in the British Medical Journal a few days later (December 5, 1914) [7], cases from the Belgian Army began first to arrive at Calais on November 20, and came in at the rate of twenty to thirty a day. On December 2 the Hon., now Sir Arthur Stanley, and Sir H. C. Perrott, of the Joint Committee of the British Red Cross Society and of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, wrote to the Times stating that the Committee was making a grant of A10,000 for hospitals for typhoid amongst the Belgians, and on the same date a leading article in that newspaper drew attention to the seriousness of the position. On December 5 there was published, also in the Times, an anonymous letter, signed " W. A. F.," in which the writer stated that a week previously he had been in a town in South-East Belgium, occupied by the Germans, that there' were 1,500 cases of typhoid in the town, and that the authorities were providing accommodation for 4,000 additional cases. In another leading article the Times suggested that there was a good deal of typhoid in the German Army and that the disease might spread. On December 7 two letters appeared, one from Colonel Fairholme, the other from Dr. Melis, who were both at Dunkirk,-accusing Major Stedman of exaggeration. Dr. Melis, who was officially connected with the Belgian Army, stated that, there had been only 126 cases amongst the Belgian troops. The Times returned to the subject the next day with a special article in which it repeated the belief that the German Army was, infected, and added the suggestion that the disease was likely to spread through floods, a view which was supported by a writer in the Lancet for December 12, 1914 . There the subject ended, so far as the Times was concerned. But the 126 cases in the Belgian Army, admitted by Dr. Melis on December 7i 'were quite sufficient to point to what was taking place there and was likely to happen later. The epidemic must have been well on its way about that time; not only was the Belgian Army affected, but also the British, French and German Armies, and Belgian civilians. Of the British and French military cases I shall make mention later. As regards the German Army there is evidence, besides that to which I have already alluded, that the military authorities had considerable anxiety on account of typhoid during the last quarter of 1914. There were meetings of German medical men at the end of 1914 and beginning of 1915, and the British Medical Journal [8] of May 29, 1915, stated that " in the accounts appearing in the German medical press figures are not given, but enough is published to show that these outbreaks Section of Epidemiology and State Medicine have given great trouble and that they have in some respects differed from the classical picture of typhoid fever." According to Bruns [9] there were 20,000 cases in the German.Army during 1914-15. The German writers Goldscheider and Kroner, whom I have already quoted, state that the disease appeared in the German Army during the second week in September, 1914, and reached its height in November. I do not mean to suggest that the typhoid in either the French or German Armies was confined to the Flanders area. It was certainly prevalent elsewhere, for in March, 1915, we find Professor Grober [10] , discussing its prevalence on both German fronts, and as regards the French, according to Bousquet [11] , there was an epidemic during the first fortnight of September, 1914, in the military territory of Belfort. Factors which helped both to propagate and foster the epidemic were overcrowding and difficulties with the supply of water and the' removal of exereta. For instance the search parties of the Friends' Ambulance Unit found later on, in March and April, 1915, that at Brielen, with a normal population of 800 to 900 persons, there were 500 refugees; in the commune of Proven, besides the usual population of 1,600, there were 600 refugees; in that of Watou, population 3,500, there had been as many refugees, and even in the middle of April there were still 2,500. In Vlamertinghe there were 3,000 refugees. It must further be remembered that many of these towns and villages also contained large numbers of soldiers, billeted and encamped. Inquiry elicited that in some of these places the water from the wells had never been satisfactory in quantity or quality even before the War, and was usually " troublee" after heavy rain. The overcrowding increased the difficulty as to quantity.
It would appear that the outbreak began to assume epidemic proportions soon after the armies settled down to trench warfare in November, 1914. By the end of the year the epidemic was assuming a very serious aspect, and was compelling the attention of the various authorities. Many civilian cases of enteric were daily being brought to the notice of the medical staff of the Friends' Ambulance Unit, who were stationed at Ypres, and it is through my membership of this organization that I learnt most of 'the facts which I am about to relate.
The Unit had posted a party in the affected area, Ypres and its neighbourhood, as early as October, 1914. After several adventurous attempts to find a suitable refuge for the sick and wounded inhabitants who still remained in and about the town, the Unit obtained possession of part of a large asylum for lunatics, L'Asile du Sacre Coceur, the other part of which was occupied by a military ambulance. This was a fine building, erected only a few years previously just outside Ypres on the Poperinghe road. At that time, December 1, 1914, it had escaped damage. On December 21 and 22, however, it was shelled, and the -inmates had to be evacuated. But a return was made a few days later, on December 27, and the building, most of the wards of which remained intact, was used as a hospital by the Unit till the second bombardment of Ypres in April, 1915. The Unit's local headiquarters were also set up in this institution.
Besides the treatment of patients in hospital the medical officers of the Unit carried on an extensive outdoor visiting.practice amongst the remaining inhabitants of Ypres and the surrounding villages not occupied by the enemy. During the latter part of December cases of febrile diarrhcea, which roused a suspicion of enteric, began to occur in considerable numbers. The medical officers seem at first to have -had some doubt as to the diagnosis, because the cases did not correspond to enteric as they had known it in times of peace in England and other countries, and there was no means then available to them of supplementing clinical by bacteriological methods of diagnosis. It was no very long period, however, before the true nature of the cases was recognized.
From the middle of November, 1914, to the middle of January, 1915, Ypres had been evacuated by the armies. Then both the British and French Armies returned, and the sanitary conditions necessarily occupied the earnest attention of the medical departments. The Friends' Ambulance Unit was now able to undertake a very important role. I have been informed that in January, 1915, there were upwards of 8,000 civilians still in the town of Ypres, and large numbers in the neighbouring villages. But few Belgian medical practitioners remained. I suppose there had been a large call on the profession in that part of Belgium for service in the army and -amongst refugees elsewhere. Moreover, those doctors who stayed had not' such facilities for getting about as' were at the disposal *of members of the Unit. Conisequently the services rendered by -the Unit in succouring the sick and distressed had greatly endeared -it to the inhabitants, with whom, therefore, it had considerable influence. Indeed, the hospital in the asylum had been recognized by the Ypres Committee of Safety as the Ypres Civil Hospital. The authorities of the British Army, therefore, acted wisely when they determined to enlist the services of the Unit as a friendly link between themselves and the Belgian Civil Authorities, for while it was absolutely necessary to enforce certain measures in order to ensure the safety of the health of the armies, it was desirable to do so with as little friction as possible between the British Army on the one hand and the Belgian Civil Government and population on the other. Not only did the Unit carry out this delicate and difficult duty with tact and success, but its share in the execution of a number of sanitary measures which it was found necessary to put into action was large and important. The heads of the Unit at that time Area Affected by the Epidenmic.-Whilst we know that there was a. considerable amount of enteric in the German Army in Flanders towards the latter part of 1914, we know nothing as to the extent to which the civil population in the territory occupied by the enemy was affected. The same uncertainty exists in respect of the area over which the epidemic spread itself. I can speak only of the country occupied by the Allies. The patients, civil and military, who came under the cognizance of the Friends' Ambulance Unit came almost entirely from that small corner of Belgium which the Germans had not invaded, from Nieuport on the north to Ploegsteert on the south. This is an area about thirty-one miles long by twelve broad. The patients were Belgian civilians and French soldiers. A considerable number of the Belgians were refugees from places witLhin the German lines; a few of them, at the beginning of the epidemic, may have been infected in these places. Most of them, however, became attacked in the towns and villages in which th,ey had found a temporary home. A few French soldiers under my care had fallen ill in places at a considerable distance from the frontier on the French side; but they may have been, and most probably were, infected at the Front. As the medical officers of the Unit were brought into contact only with patients who were either French soldiers who had been on active service at the Front when they fell ill, or with Belgian civilian inhabitants and refugees, I cannot say with absolute certainty whether or not the epide!mic flowed over the Franco-Belgian frontier. I have no evidence that it did. No Belgian refugees stayed in that part of France, and French civilians were not allowed to cross over the' frontier into Belgium. As it was the refugees who brought the disease into the Belgian villages away fi5om the Front, in their absence from French territory the presence of the disease was hardly to be expected. The authorities of Dunkirk were naturally apprehensive of an outbreak on account of its proximity to the epidemic area. But so far as I could ascertain no cases arose in that town or its suburbs during the three and a half months I was there (January to May, 1915).
Nor am I certain whether the epidemic suddeily and quickly spread over the area mentioned above, or gradually invaded it. The cases firstdealt with by the Unit naturally came from. its centres of work, Ypres and Poperinghe, and their immediate vicinity; but there are reasons for believing that the epidemic spread rapidly towards the end of December, 1914. Number of Cases.-As with regard to the extent of country affected so in respect of the number of persons attacked my information is liimited; but so far as it goes it indicates that the number was very considerable. During my stay in Dunkirk I visited three large military hospitals in that port and its iAmmediate neighbourhood which contained between them about 3,000 beds, nearly all of which were occupied by enteric cases; and there were other hospitals concerning which I received information, but which I did not visit, containing some hundreds of similar cases. So anxious were the French authorities for increased accommodation for enteric fever cases amongst their troops *in the Ypres sector that they appealed to the Friends' Ambulance Unit for assistance in providibig them. Even if it is admitted that not all the cases received into these hospitals were enteric yet there must have been somewhere about 4,000 cases under treatment daily during January and February, 1915, in Dunkirk and its neighbourhood. How many cases there were in the Belgian Army I do not know, but from the statements already quoted from the Times and the British Medical Journal the number must have been considerable. The British Army furnished comparatively few cases, only 827 up to May 22, 1915. As for the German Army I have already stated the reasons for concluding that there were in it a very large number of cases. Of Belgian civilians in round numbers 1,000 passed through the wards of the hospitals of the Friends' Ambulance Unit at Ypres and Poperinghe, all of them suffering from enteric; most of the admissions were during the three months January to March. It has been estimated by one of the medical officers of the Unit who is thoroughly conversant with that branch of the Unit's work, that about 1,000 other cases came to the cognizance of the officers of the Unit, patients who remained in their homes, or were admitted to other hospitals, Belgian and British. Doubtless there were other cases of which the. Unit never heard.
Character of the Cases.-As I have already stated, there was at first some doubt as to the true nature of the disease; but before I joined the Unit the medical officers had come to the conclusion that most of the cases were enteric. On, February 1 I went to Poperinghe and stayed there for two or three weeks, so that I had ample opportunity of clinical observation both there and at Ypres. I confirmed the opinion already expressed by the medical officer in charge, that the disease was enteric, though the type was a little different from what I had been accustomed to meet with in London. I quote from a report which I made to the Committee of the Unit at the time:-"The patients were Flemish civiliaps. The majority of them were refugees.
A few of them showed signs of deprivation of food, and many were very dirty, and were the subjects of bed-sores and other cutaneous lesions when they were admitted. Women were in a decided majority, which was, I suppose, to be accounted for by the fact that a large number of the men were serving in the army. The majority were of the ages at which enteric is most common, 15 to 25. The type of disease was severe, especially amongst the Ypres cases. .... The patients were very ill on admission; it was rare for a patient to be admitted who had been ill less than a week, and most of them had been ill for two or three weeks or longer.
The disease as I saw it at Poperinghe and Ypres differed in several points from the types I had been accustomed to see in England during the previous twenty-five years.
(1) The fever, as shown by the temperature charts, ran a very irregular course, the oscillations being frequent and extreme, so that the curve on the chart at the height of the disease resembled in many cases that of a case of pyemia or phthisis rather than of enteric fever. High temperatures, 1040 to to 105°F., were by no means uncommon, though the temperature seldom remained at this height for any length of time.
(2) A considerable number of the cases exhibited pronounced nervous symptoms, coma, or semi-coma, or on the other hand restlessness and delirium. An interesting point was that in the cases which recovered the mental symptoms did not quickly pass off as the general condition improved and as the temperature fell. The comatose cases did worse than the others; in such cases death occurred without recovery of consciousness, even though the temperature fell. I am inclined to attribute this mental state to the harassing conditions under which the patients had been living for some time before they were taken ill.....
(3) The clinical evidence went to show that probably the intestinal lesions ... . swere by no means extensive or severe. Death was due either to cardiac failure, probably caused by myocarditis, or to hypostatic pneumonia. The number of cases of intestinal hbmorrhage and perforation were distinctly below the average. While I was at Poperinghe there was only one case in which there was reason for supposing that perforation had occurred (no autopsy was made), and two of hemorrhage; both the latter cases were slight so far as the haemoirrhage was concerned. Including the cases in the wards of which I had charge and those under the care of, Dr.-Rees, there must have been nearly 120 cases through the hospital while I was there. I was informed by Dr. Fox and Dr. de Wulf that the same scarcity of perforation cases was noticed at the Sacr6 Coeur Hospital at Ypres and the civil hospital at Poperinghe. The olinical symptoms were borne out by such post-mortem evidence as I was able to obtaini. An autopsy was performed on eight cases at Poperinghe. The conditions under which the examinations were made-were such as allowed us to inspect only the abdominal organs. In every case the intestinal ulceration which is present in the vast majority of cases fatal from enteric fever, was found, but in only one of the eight cases was it recent. In the remaining seven cases it was comparatively old, and in two or three it was in process of repair. In only one of these seven cases had the ulceration been extensive or deep." [This disQrepancy between symptoms and intestinal lesions was found also by Henke [4] in the case of German soldiers who died of enteric in this epidemic.] Later on, at Dunkirk, during the months of March and April, I had under mry observation upwards of 100 French soldiers who were suffering from enteric fever. On the whole these cases were cettainly not so severe as those I had seen at Poperinghe and Ypres, even though they were cases in which in most instances the infection had been received at or in the neighbourhood of those places. They conformed, also, to the type of the disease I had been used to seeing in England. Several reasons may be given to account for this difference. In the first place the patients, who were soldiers of the French Army, had been wellcared for before they were attacked by the disease; and especially they had evidently all been well fed. In the second-place a considerable number of them had been inoculated against typhoid fever. The civilian patients I saw at Ypres and Poperinghe had not been inoculated.
Thirdly, a large proportion were not cases of typhoid, but of paratyphoid, and these diseases are well-known to be usually less severe than typhoid. Doubtless some of the cases I had seen at Poperinghe were cases of paratyphoid, but not till after I left that place was itpogsible to apply serum tests or make bacteriological examinations. Even if there had been a large proportion of paratyphoids amongst the Poperinghe and Ypres cases which I saw in February, 1915, the fact remains that. that group of enteric cases was of a severe type. It is possible that paratyphcid might under certain circumstances assume a severe character, and Marcel Labbe [12] has described a small epidemic in which the fatality was as high as 11 per cent.
Early in March, 1915, the laboratory at the Queen Alexandra Hospital, Dunkirk, the temporary hut hospitalerected by the Unit in response to the request of the French military authorities, came to our assistance. The laboratory was under the charge of Dr. H. T. Gillett, who was responsible for the blood cultures and serum tests of the patients admitted to the hospital. He also investigated a num4er of the cases in the hospital at Poperinghe during March; later the examination of these cases was undertaken by bacteriologists'of the R.A.M.C.
As soon as laboratory methods of diagnosis were employed it was found that a considerable number of the enteric cases in both these hospitals were paratyphoid. In forty-three cases at the Queen Alexandra Hospital in which the blood cultures were positive, sixteen were typhoid, twenty-two were paratyphoid A, three were paratyphoid B, and two were paratyphoid, though whether A or B was not ascertained. If we add to these cases those in which the results of the blood serum tests were taken as clinching the diagnosis, then there were forty-three cases of typhoid, thirty-two of paratyphoid A, twelve of paratyphoid B, and two of paratyphoid, ? A or B; so that rather more than half, 51'6 per cent., were paratyphoid. This proportion is vastly different from that found amongst the Belgian civilians admitted to the Hopital Elisabeth at Poperinghe. Out of 308 cases in which the clinical diagnosis was supplemented by positive blood cultures or serum tests, 245 were typhoid, sixty-two were paratyphoid B, and only one paratyphoid A; that is 20x4 per cent. were paratyphoid. Probably several causes account for this difference. In the first place the Dunkirk cases were fewer in number than those at Poperinghe; secondly, the Dunkirk cases occurred during the two months from the middle of February to the middle of April, while the Poperinghe cases were spread over the period from the beginning of January to the middle of September. I am referring to the dates at which the patients must have been infected. Thirdly, the proportion of patients in the two groups who were inoculated against typhoid is different. Of the 102 cases in the Queen Alexandra Hospital at Dunkirk which were diagnosed as enteric, thirty, or 29w4 per cent., had not been inoculated; while of the 454 admitted to the Hopital Elisabeth at Poperinghe, 418, or 92 0 per cent., had not been inoculated. In the fourth place, local conditions must be taken into account, such, I mean, as the presence in any particular area of more or fewer cases of the three varieties of enteric. At the Italian front, for instance, during the period December, 1915, to February, 1917, it was found that the proportions of the three varieties varied from time to time. According to Crossonini [13] , duiring the period December, 1915, to July, 1916, the percentages were as follows: Typhoid, 38; paratyphoid A, 6; paratyphoid B, 56; while during the period August, 1916, to February, 1917, they were: typhoid, 9: paratyphoid A, 73; paratyphoid B, 18. Crossonini attributed these variations to the variations in the proportions of inoculated men; but the factor I have just mentioned must not be forgotten. In their book, " Typhoid Fevers and Paratyphoid Fevers," Vincent and Muratet, referring to certain statistics derived from the French Army since the outbreak of this war, write as follows: " These statistics . . . . show that in the Army in campaign, paratyphoid A fevers are muc'h more frequent than paratyphoid B. In certain regions, however, paratyphoid B has been predominant " (loc. cit., p. 91). In the British Armny in Flanders during 1914-15, 50 to 60 per cent. of the enteric cases were paratyphoid,' while, according to SirWilliam Leishman, there was amongst the paratyphoid cases an excess of paratyphoid B varying from three-fourths to two-thirds. In the British Army in the East, Dr. Buchanan told us last year that, with some local exceptions, paratyphoid A predominated. Fifthly, the Dunkirk patients were French soldiers, the Poperinghe patients were Belgian civilians. The occurrence of cases of paratyphoid A in considerable numbers was one of the surprises of the War so far as enteric fever is concerned. It is generally believed that it was introduced by carriers in troops from the East. Paratyphoid A was very rare in Europe before tde War, and paratyphoid B was not common. Not more than 3 per cent. of all enteric cases were paratyphoid and they were paratyphoid B. Vincent and Muratet, however, state that before the War Germany was the most important seat of paratyphoid, of both A and B variety. They place the incidence of paratyphoid in the enteric class in that country ' Brit. Med. Jotrn., 1915, i, p. 391. as high as 10 per cent. Before the War, in France, especially in the army, paratyphoid B occurred in small local epidemics, and paratyphoid A was rare. It is clear, therefore, that in given numbers of enteric cases in this War, the'proportion of the three varieties has varied according to time and place. The figures given above indicate that the Belgian civilians were not exposed to the infection of paratyphoid A, but that the French soldiers were. This was probably the case, on account of the presence amongst them of troops from the East, native as well as European. In this epidemic, as in others in this War, the three varieties of enteric were mingled one with the other, and there were cases of double and triple infection, which I have not differentiated. Last, and perhaps not least, the warning must be repeated which was sounded by Dr. Buchanan in his president's address of a year ago, that different laboratory methods in different hands will yield different results.
As to the severity of the epidemic, as gauged by the fatality, I am able to give the figures only for the cases treated in the two hospitals at Poperinghe and Dunkirk. Of thp 435 cases of undoubted enteric fever admitted to the former hospital during the febrile stage of the disease, ninety-three died, a fatality of 21a3 per cent.; while of 102 such cases admitted to the latter, ten died, a rate of 9'8 per cent. The Poperinghe cases were of all ages and both sexes, with a majority of females; the Dunkirk cases were all males, mostly from 20 to 40 years of age. The'Poperinghe rate is somewhat high, the Dunkirk rate is certainly low. I have already given the reasons for the difference in the severity of the two groups of cases, reasons which apply to a certain extent to the differences in the fatality rates. I am bound, however, to add that there is a curious difference in the fatality rates of the typhoid and paratyphoid cases in the two hospitals. For the Hopital Elisabeth they are as follows: Typhoid, 9 7 per cent.; paratyphoid, 19'2 per cent. For the Queen Alexandra Hospital: Typhoid, 20'9 per cent.; paratyphoid, 2'1 per cent. In the absence of other details respecting the Poperinghe cases, I am quite unable to explain *these differences. The Dunkirk figures conform with the fatalities of typhoid and paratyphoid as^met with by other observers in various countries and at different times, but they are too scanty for trustworthy conclusions.
So much for the general character of the epidemic in so far as it came within my knowledge. I will now turn to the measures employed against it. As is the case in any epidemic they were (1) those for providing for the sick; and (2) those for protecting 'the healthy.
(1) First, as regards the provision for the sick. The medical departments 'of the several armies dealt with the soldiers, and the Friends' Ambulance Unit chiefly with the civilians. Even' before the regulations as to the'removal of enteric cases were issued by the Belgian authorities the Unit began to receive such cases into the Hopital du Sacre Coeur at Ypres towards the end of December, and 100 beds were set aside for enteric in that institution. In consequence of the increase in the number of cases the Hopital Elisabeth was opened at Poperinghe a month later. This was a large private house on the outskirts of the town which happened to be empty at the time. Originally, there were seventy beds, but in the course of a few' weeks huts were erected to accommodate eighty more patients. At first Dr. Rees was in charge, afterwards Dr., now Captain, Henry, R.A.M.C. It was, however, even as early as January, clear to the Unit that it would not be able to cope with all the cases that were certain to require removal to hospital. The authorities of the British Armny, therefore, in collaboration with the Belgian Government, established a large hospital at Malasisse, near St. Omer, about twenty-five miles from Poperinghe and thirty-two from Ypres. Belgian doctors and orderlies were employed in this hospital, so that the patients should not feel that they were entirely amongst strangers. As this hospital was too far from the Ypres district for the patients to be visited by their friends, it will be readily understood that some apprehension arose, to allay which the Belgian civil authorities issued handbills explanatory of the position, and pointing out'how information as to the progress of the sick could be obtained. The patients were removea from the hospitals at Ypres and Poperinghe by ambulance convoys of the R.A.M.C. At first only convalescent or nearly convalescent patients were removed, and the first convoy ran on February 7. Later, I understand, cases in earlier stages of the disease were transported, and the two hospitals near the Front were used as casualty clearing stations for 'enteric patients. The convoys continued to run till the hospital ceased to be used for enteric cases, and so far as I can learn without any mishap, so admirably were the arrangements designed and carried out by the A.M.S.
After the German attack in April, 1915, many patients were removed straight from their homes to the hospital at Malasisse. I have already mentioned that other hospitals were established not only for soldiers, but for civilians; at Coxyde and Bailleul, for instance, but of these I have no details, except of the Queen Alexandra Hospital at Dunkirk, which was erected by the Friends' Ambulance Unit at the request of Sectiont of Epidemiology and State Medicine the French military authorities. There were 200 beds in the hospital, but its use for enteric cases continued for only about three months, as the shelling of Dunkirk at long range towards the end of April led to the removal of the enteric cases elsewhere.
(2) As regards the measures adopted for preventing the spread of the epidemic by protecting the healthy, the authorities acted quickly and energetically. They were such as are usually taken in epidemics of this nature-viz.: (a) The removal and isolation of the sick in the hospitals already mnentioned; (b) the cleansing and disinfection of premises; and (c) the provision of a safe water supply. Besides these there was an unusual measure-namely (d) the inoculation of the civil inhabitants of the infected areas with antityphoid vaccine.
The difficulties in carrying out these measures were considerable.
The affected country reached right up -to the very trenches, and. embraced a large tr4ct which was at any time liable to enemy attack. Troops of three armies were billeted in the towns and villages. It was necessary to enlist the co.operation of the authorities of three armies and of a civilian population. But these obstacles formed little, if any, hindrance to the execution of a comprehensive plan. In order to remove the infectious sick to hospitals, the sick must first be found; to cleanse insanitary premises, they must be known and inspected. The sick soldiers could be and were dealt with by the Army authorities. The difficult problem was the civilian population. In consequence very largely of conferences between representatives of the Belgian Government and local civil authorities, of the British Army, and of the Friends' Ambulance Unit, a concerted and drastic action, on the lines indicated, was agreed upon. In the first place the Belgian authorities issued an order by which (i) antityphoid inoculation was made obligatory for the civil population in the zone occupied by the allied armies: and it was ordered that persons refusing to be inoculated should be expelled from the zone and treated as refugees; (ii) enteric fever was made notifiable by the medical practitioners to the local authorities and the inspector of the Service du Sante; wilful omission to notify was punishable by a fine or imprisonment. Persons ill of enteric were to be moved to hospital if necessary. A notice stating the nature of the illness in French and Flemish was to be placed on the doors of houses from which a case of typhoid was removed; and the notice was to remain up till the house was disinfected. Inoculation and disinfection were to be performed gratuitously.
These measures are sufficiently drastic. I am not aware of another instance in which inoculation against typhoid has been made comapulsory upon a civil population, with a punishment of deportation for refusal. Maurange states that upwards of 5,100 civilians were inoculated in and about Paris in September, 1914, but in this instance inoculation was submitted to voluntarily. Even before the Government order was promulgated inocufation against typhoid had been urged upon the civilians in Ypres by the Friends' Ambulance Unit, and the first inoculations were performed on February 5 by its medical officer. Bills and posters were prepared and distributed, in which inoculation was urged. Inoculation stations were distributed in and about Ypres; and a large number of persons submitted themselves to this prophylactic. Through the kindness of Sir George Newman, K.C.B., the ChLairman of the Committee of the Unit, I am able to give the number of civilians inoculated by the medical officers from February 5, 1915 , to the end of May, 1916 I have dealt first with the inoculation of the civilian population because it is the subject of the first article in the Belgian Order; but it was by no means the only nor even the principal of the prophylactic measures adopted. Not even the most ardent advocate of inoculation claims that it will protect everyone. A very urgent question was the water supply. I have said that this was mostly derived from surface wells. I was informed that the supply of Ypres was good before the War. The water-tower remained undamaged up to April, 1915; but the bombardment of the town in November, 1914, had broken many oof the mains, and the supply could not be maintained. The inhabitants had, therefore, to fall back on water from wells and the moat.. In January, 1915, the Burgomaster had ordered the boiling of all water used for drinking and for cleaning food utensils. But it was deemed advisable to sterilize the water as far as possible before it was delivered. Under the direction of Captain Coplans the swimming bath situated at the north-east corner of the town and capable of holding 14 million gallons, was cleaned and made use of as a storage-tank. Water from the adjacent moat was treated with chloride of lime and turned into the bath, from which it was pumped into barrels and distributed to seven fixed stations. Two or three times a day the water at the stations was tested by one of the members of the Unit, in order to ensure that no untreated water had been added surreptitiously. From 45,000 to 75,000 litres were distributed daily. At Dickebusch a similar -system was installed. In other towns and villages the inhabitants were warned of the danger of drinking unboiled or untreated water. Chloride of lime was supplied to householders, together with a little spoon-measure and a printed card of instructions. The work of distribution was carried out almost entirely by the Unit, and up to the end of June, 1915, over 1,800 householders were supplied in Poperinghe and the villages near that town and Ypres.
The duties of finding the cases of enteric and investigating the sanitary conditions of the towns and villages in the area just mentioned were assigned to the Unit. Search parties were formed; each party consisted of a doctor, four voluntary orderlies, four interpreters (certain nuns who spoke French and Flemish), and two motor ambulances with drivers. The search was conducted systematically, street by street, and house by house. Cases of enteric were removed to hospital, unless they could be safely left. The sanitary condition was examined and investigation made as to the water and food supply. Inoculation was brought to the notice of the inmates and urged upon them. For each house a card was filled up giving the results of these inquiries, which was handed in to the local headquarters of the Unit the same evening so that a card index could be kept. A distinctive mark was placed on the door of the house, for the benefit of the sanitary squad, R.A.M.C., who followed the visits of the search parties. The search parties were working under the supervision of the sanitary officer, Captain Coplans, and reports as to the discovery of cases of enteric, the sanitary state of the premises and so forth were regularly furnished to him. The sanitary squad undertook the disinfection and cleansing. In Ypres, at any rate, a local contractor emptied the cesspits, disposed of the contents by burning or burial in fields away from the house, and executed repairs.
The search parties began their work on February 14 and continued it till June 28, 1915. The area which they thoroughly explored consisted of the quadrilateral Ypres, Elverdinghe, Poperinghe, La Clytte, and the triangle, Poperinghe, Proven and Watou. A few villages outside these areas were also dealt with on reports made to the Unit that their insanitary condition rendered a visit necessary. A list of infected houses was drawn up which covered a much larger area than that traversed by the search parties. The compilation of this list, indeed, was commenced before these parties got to work. Spot maps showing infected houses were also prepared. During the period mentioned above, four months, nearly 6,500 houses were inspected, of which 700 (about 10 per cent.) were found, to be in a very insanitary condition. The bulk of this work was accomplished before the second bombardment of Ypres and neighbouring towns and the renewed German attack in April, and these acts of warfare brought most of this work to a standstill.
These are the facts-I regret they are so meagre-so far as they have come to my knowledge concerning this epidemic. The epidemiologist and the health administrator will ask, "What were the results of the measures I have mentioned upon the course of the epidemic?" The question is difficult to answer in respect of any epidemic; it is particularly so of this. -All epidemics sooner or later die a death which is natural and without the interference of a human executioner. More than one instrument is usually employed to bring them to an end; each at its best is seldom perfectly efficacious, and, therefore, when apparently they have been effective, the share of each in the consummation is difficult to estimate. In the Flanders epidemic there was present at least one other than the usual factors-namely, the flight of large numbers. of the, civil population from the slough of infection before the renewed attack of the enemy. I was informed about the middle of March by certain French army medical officers in Dunkirk that so far as they were able to judge by the enteric admissions.to the hospitals in that town, the epidemic was then on the wane in the French Army. By the beginning of the summer it was at an end, not only in the armies-but also amongst the civilians. If I were to attribute this result to any human agency, I should attach more importance to the effects produced by the usual sanitary measures (the disinfecting of the water, the removal of the sick to hospitEl, the cleansing of houses, and so forth), than to the inoculations; and for the following reasons. The inoculations were against infection by Bacillus typhosus, and not against 34 Goodall: Enteric Fever in Flanders I expected an epidemic in the winter of 1915-16 at any rate, in spite of the care which had been taken as regptrds water supplies and sanitary precautions generally, because if ever a soil was saturated with the poison of enteric, it was that of Flanders in the winter of 1914-15 and the following spring; but so far as my knowledge goes, there has been no enteric worth mentioning in that region since the epidemic which has been the subject of this address. I suppose that now the enemy has been driven from that country, the civilian inhabitants will soon be returning in large numbers. In those who were inoculated in 1915-16 the protective effects will by this time have disappeared. Every effort should and doubtless will be made to prevent a fresh outbreak. For even if the virus does not persist in the polluted soil, and according to Vincent and Muratet the paratyphoid A and B bacilli are much more resistant to external causes of destruction and also much longer-lived in water than are the bacilli of typhoid, yet the sanitary conditions can hardly have been so much improved as to render its reintroduction by cases or carriers at all unlikely.
